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Our aim in this paper is to provide a general framework in which to determine
the optimal penalty fee inducing the contractor to respect the contracted delivery
date in public procurement contracts (PPCs). We do this by developing a real
option model that enables us to investigate the contractor’s value of investment
timing ﬂexibility which the penalty rule - de facto - introduces. We then apply
this setting in order to evaluate the range of penalty fees in the Italian legislation
on PPC. According to our calibration analysis, there is no evidence that the
substantial delays recorded in the execution times of Italian investments are due
to incorrectly set penalty fees. This result opens the way for other explanations
of delays in PPCs: we thus extend our model to include the probability that the
penalty is ineﬀectively enforced and study how calibration results are accordingly
aﬀected. We ﬁnally show how our model can be used to investigate both the case
of a penalty/premium rule and that of an optimal penalty fee in a concession
contract.
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11 Introduction
The deterioration of public ﬁnance and the increase in global competition have
forced governments and public institutions to obtain “the best value for money”
through the purchase of goods, works and services in the form of procurement
contracts. Eﬃcient public procurement contracts (henceforth PPCs) are thus
emerging as a “core necessity for ... the public’s sector eﬀectiveness in obtain-
ing resources for social spending and/or lower taxes” (Dimitri et al., 2006).
These contracts have recently recorded a rapid increase both in number and in
value, reaching 16% of GDP in the EU, and around 20% in the United States.1
However, PPCs have both costs and beneﬁts: their beneﬁts (i.e. allocative
and productive eﬃciency) can be quickly erased by the costs (i.e. ineﬃciency)
which often arise from contractual incompleteness and all the issues that ensue
therefrom.2
In this paper we speciﬁcally address the source of ineﬃciency which pertains
to delays in PPC execution times3 by investigating the optimal penalty design
which should provide the right incentive to prevent delays. Indeed, delays in de-
livery dates in PPCs may negatively aﬀect all the actors involved, i.e. they may
determine direct costs for the procurer, lower ﬁrms’ proﬁts (i.e. ﬁrms other than
the contractor) and reduce consumers’ utility. The typical illustrative example
in this regard is provided by a PPC for roadway resurfacing, rehabilitation and
restoration: if these activities are undertaken in heavily urbanized areas, they
may cause extreme traﬃc congestion and severe inconvenience to the travelling
public and the business community. Thus, delays in the completion of these
works prolong the negative impact on users (i.e. a social cost), and also cause
overruns in the planned execution costs.4
There is evidence that delays in delivery dates have been particularly large
and harmful in the recent Italian experience of PPCs. The data-base compiled
by the Italian Authority in charge of controlling PPCs (Autorità per la Vigi-
lanza sui Contratti Pubblici di Lavori, Servizi e Forniture - AVLP) records all
contracts of a value between 150,000 and 15,000,000 euros awarded by munic-
1Note that between 1995 and 2002 PPCs in the EU underwent a
31% increase in value (Dimitri, et al., 2006: Ch. 1). See also:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/publicprocurement/index_en.htm
2The economic and engineering literatures give diﬀerent explanations for the main issues
arising in PPCs. Most of the economic analysis on this topic focusses on the information
asymmetry concerning production costs between the supplier and the procurer (Laﬀont and
Tirole, 1993), while engineering and construction managment analysis concentrates on the
uncertainty which aﬀects the contract after it has been signed and its eﬀects on both the
supplier and the procurer (Bartholomew, 1998). For an economic methodological discussion
on contract incompleteness and unforeseen contingencies see Maskin and Tirole (1999).
3In the economic literature on PPCs, delivery delays in contract execution are often con-
sidered along with the issue of the supplier’s performance regarding contracted aims (i.e.
quality). See on this: Engel et al. (2006b).
4Cost overruns in diﬀerent procurement contracts have been investigated in the seminal
paper by Bajari and Tadelis (2001): they showed that cost plus contracts are better than
ﬁxed price contracts when the project carried out through the procurement is more complex.
Focusing on ﬁxed price contracts, Ganuza (2007) found that when the procurement market is
more competitive, cost overruns are lower and decreasing with the design speciﬁcation level.
2ipalities, local/regional public authorities and public ﬁrms. Our examination
of this data-base highlighted that out of 43,863 fully exploited contracts in the
period 2000-2006, about 32,731 had been completed with delays. For about
27,826 contracts, the delay contracted days ratio5 was always larger than 1,
and it was higher, the greater the contract value (with a small slowdown in the
trend for the more expensive contracts, see Table 1 below).6
Table 1: Delays on Italian PPCs, 2000-2006
Similar ﬁndings on the sustantial body of evidence on delays in the Italian
PPCs have been recorded by other empirical analyses7 and call - primarily - for
investigation into the eﬀectiveness of the penalty rules currently adopted in such
contracts. According to Italian law,8 the penalty fee in PPCs should be deﬁned
as a percentage - ranging between 0.03% and 0.1 % - of the total contract price
for each day of delay in completion of the contracted works.9
Is there something wrong with the deﬁnition of these ranges? Answering
this question should inform the decision on whether to insert a penalty rule in
5This ratio has the following interpretation: for example, if 200 days are the ex-ante
contracted time for the infrastructure’s execution and then its delivering occurs with 220 days
of delay, the delay contracted days ratio results equal to 1.1.
6These estimations and further analysis on the data-set are available from the authors on
request.
7See Bentivogli et al. (2007) and ANCE (2002). The former study reports interviews
conducted with 32 local Contracting Authorities managing about 280 PPCs: only one third
of these contracting authorities declared that the contract had been executed within the con-
tracted time, or with very small delays. In the latter study, a detailed investigation conducted
at regional level by ANCE Emilia Romagna highlights that of the 776 PPCs concluded in the
period 2001-2002, more than 68% recorded delays and/or increases in cost execution. Similar
results have been found at national level (see ANCE, 2005 and AVLP, 2005 ).
8See Government Decree n◦ 163/2006 and D.P.R. 554/1999, art.117.
9This penalty rule for Italian PPCs is determined in similar fashion in other countries; in
regard to the US, Herbsaman et al. (1995, Table 6, p. 276) show that for PPCs in highway
construction, the contracting authority usually sets penalties ranging from 0.03% to 0.3% of
the contract value for each day of delay.
3the PPC and what its optimal design should be. Thus, the aim of this paper
is twofold: ﬁrst, to provide a theoretical and general framework in which to
investigate how the inclusion of a penalty fee aﬀects the contract value; second,
to verify whether the penalty range currently adopted in the Italian legislation
on PPCs correctly induces the contractor to avoid delays.
Our starting point is that the inclusion of a penalty clause in a PPC gives
the contractor - to some extent - the option of deciding the investment timing
for the contract’s execution. Thus - in order to be eﬀective - the penalty fee
should consider the investment timing ﬂexibility which, de facto, increases the
supplier’s contract value. To correctly approach the issue, we propose a simple
Real Option model which allows us to ascertain the value of investment timing
ﬂexibility induced by the inclusion of the penalty clause in the contract.10 Then,
calibrating the model, we verify the range of penalty fees deﬁned by the Italian
legislation on PPCs: quite surprisingly, we ﬁnd that this range indeed seems
able to induce the contractor to respect the contractual execution time.
This result sheds new light on the determinants of investment delays in PPCs
which include explicit penalty rules, and it adds a new aim to our study because
it leads to other cause-and-eﬀect explanations speciﬁcally related to the enforce-
ment of the penalty clause itself. Following results generally acknowledged in
the incomplete contract literature, failures by the Contracting Authority (hence-
forth, CA) to enforce the penalty clause can arise when: i) the contractor’s work
execution time is non-veriﬁable11; ii) default by the contractor triggers costly
and time-consuming litigation because the “quality” of the judicial system is
unsatisfactory; iii) the court of law12 - to which the parties refer for settlement
of the dispute on the penalty payment - reduces (or even does not enforce) the
committed fee. The last two issues seem to play a major role in the Italian
experience: indeed, Albano et al. (2007) found that, in the data-set of Italian
PPCs that they investigated, only in less than 5% of veriﬁable delays was the
penalty enforced by the CAs. Moreover, with speciﬁc regard to elements deter-
mining the low enforcement of penalties in Italy, it is a matter of fact that in
the period 2004-2005 the average duration of an Italian civil trial was around
876 working days13: this, if anticipated by the contractor, may well override the
incentive provided by the penalty design.
10As Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1985; 1986) highlighted in
their seminal works, there is a close analogy between security options and investment timing
ﬂexibility.
11“To ensure the contract enforceability, the court must ﬁrst be able to verify that an agent
has disobeyed the agreed clauses of the contract” (Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002, p.348). To
our knowledge, since the seminal paper by Manelli and Vincent (1995), the analysis of the
non-veriﬁability of quality aspects in procurement (and concession) contracts has been carried
out - with diﬀering emphases - by Dalen et al. (2004), Calzolari and Spagnolo (2006) and
Moretto and Valbonesi (2007).
12See Eggleston et al. (2000) for discussion of the role of courts in enforcing contract clauses.
13See the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (2007). Moreover, an old but impressive Report by
the Commissione per la garanzia dell’informazione statistica of the Italian Government (2000,
pp. 27-28) found that in the period between 1988 and 1997, the average time taken by the
administrative (regional) courts to make a ﬁnal ruling increased from 2617 to 4261 working
days.
4We thus characterize our model to investigate how the CA’s ineﬀective en-
forcement of a penalty rule would aﬀect the extent of the optimal penalty.
Accordingly, we assume in the model that the probability of enforcement is cor-
related to a parameter identifying the “quality” of the judicial system (i.e. the
average time taken to resolve disputes) and to the level of the penalty itself.14
Our calibration results show that the probability of penalty enforcement
decreases both when i) the quality of the judicial system is low and ii) the civil
court has high discretionality in reducing the penalty imposed. Speciﬁcally,
the greater the level of the penalty that the CA would like to introduce in
the contract, the lower the probability that it will be enforced by the court.
This, in turn, calls for higher penalties - well beyond the range prescribed by
the Italian legislation - to make the ﬁrm comply with the contracted execution
time. However, if the degree of the court’s responsiveness to the penalty imposed
by the CA is high, the latter will ﬁnd it convenient to set the fee considered
reasonable by the court.
Finally, a caveat concerning our analysis should be mentioned. In principle,
delays in the PPCs’ completion time weight diﬀerently on the contract value
according to the procedure adopted in awarding it. Indeed, in the “negotiated”
procedure, the contract value is directly agreed between the parties and includes
an explicit trade-oﬀ between the contract value and the investment’s delivery
time. Diﬀerently, in the “open” procedure, the investment’s execution time can
itself be part of the successful bid, thus representing a strategic variable in the
competition among bidders.15 Although our simple model refers in principle
to PPCs awarded through the negotiated procedure because it assumes an ex-
ogenous and ﬁxed price contracted between the CA and the contractor, it is
interesting that the Italian delays contracted days ratio seem not to be cor-
related with the nature of the awarding procedure - see second part of Table
1 above. This suggests that our results could be reasonably extended to the
Italian PPCs awarded through the open procedure as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a PPC
basic model where a penalty fee is included. Section 3 presents an extension
of the model which considers a simple and symmetric penalty/premium scheme
where the contractor is punished/rewarded if it decides to delay/anticipate the
delivery date. Section 4 concludes by providing a brief summary of our ﬁndings
and policy implications. Finally, the Appendix contains all the proofs and shows
how our framework can be used to deﬁne the optimal penalty in a concession
14The enforcement of a penalty clause may also be ineﬀective (i.e. costly) in the case of
“multiple contacts” between the CA and the contractor. Indeed, when the latter has (or
expects to have) other ongoing (or future) procurements with the same CA and perceives
the committed fee as highly punitive sanction, it may take revenge on the other ongoing (or
future) PPCs. Our model does not speciﬁcally address this case.
15Indeed, of the four EU procedures for procurement ("open procedure”, “restricted proce-
dure”, “negotiated procedure”, and “competitive dialogue"), only the “open procedure” and -
partially - the “restricted procedure” make the trade-oﬀ between the contract’s price and the
delivery date explicit: the contractor makes a lower bid (i.e. asks for a lower price to execute
the contract) if it can delay the construction time. For a survey on the current EU legislation
on PPCs, see: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l22009.htm
5setting.
2 Optimal penalty fee for delays in delivery date
We consider the simple case where a CA awards a contract - a PPC - to an
economic operator (i.e. a contractor ﬁrm) to build a public infrastructure with
exogenous and ex-ante deﬁned technical characteristics.16 We assume that the
up-front investment does not depreciate and that the contractor is selected ac-
cording to a “negotiated” procedure whereby the CA ﬁrst consults some eco-
nomic operators of its choice and then agrees the terms of the contract only
with one of them.
According to the PPC, the contractor commits itself to constructing the
infrastructure immediately (i.e. at time t) in return for a ﬁxed payment p,
which is agreed by both the parties. Furthermore, the contract includes the
contractor’s liability for completion on time: i.e. if the contractor delays the
contracted delivery date it will pay a constant penalty c for each period (usually
for each day) of veriﬁable delay.
Under these assumptions, the net beneﬁt for a risk-neutral contractor (i.e.
the project’s NPV) that complies with the contract delivery time is simply given
by:
Ft = p − Ct , (1)
where Ct ≤ p is the extimated cost of building the infrastructure at time t, when
the contract is signed.
However, the introduction of the penalty clause gives - de facto - the contrac-
tor some ﬂexibility in deciding its optimal time-to-completion. This investment
timing ﬂexibility has a value that should be added to the project’s NPV as
expressed in (1). In particular if, for simplicity, we assume that the project’s
cost Ct evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion where α and σ are
constants reﬂecting the drift and the volatility of the cost process respectively,
we get:17
dCt = αCtdt + σCtdzt ,
and the contractor’s possibility of deferring the infrastructure’s completion date
becomes analogous to a Perpetual Put Option whose value is equal to:
Pt ≡ Φt − πΛt. (2)
where Φt ≡ Et(e−r(τ−t))Fτand Λt ≡ Et
   τ
t ce−r(s−t)ds
 
. Speciﬁcally, Φt is the
expected and discounted net beneﬁt from investing at a general cost Cτ < Ct,
16This setting does not ﬁt the issue of delay caused by an erroneous original project: to
investigate this issue, one should add i) a preliminary stage where the CA evaluates the
contractor’s proposal and ii) a further stage where the CA controls ex-post the infrastructure’s
execution.
17In the following equation, dzt is the increment of a standard Brownian process with mean
zero and variance dt (Dixit, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
6Λt is the expected value of the penalty at time t, π ∈ [0,1] is the probability
that a third party - i.e. a court of law - is able to enforce the penalty, r is
the risk-adjusted expected rate of return that investors would require to own
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Further, since Ft is also driven by a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. dFt =





, where β < 0 is the negative root of the quadratic equation 1
2σ2x(x−
1) +αx −r = 0.20 By substituting the expression for the discount rate into (3)














Equation (4) states that for any ﬁxed p, whenever Pt > Ft, it will be proﬁtable
for the contractor to infringe the contract’s provision on the investment’s de-
livery date. In particular, the ﬁrm will be better oﬀ by maximizing (4) with
respect to Fτ and thus determine its optimal delay. The net beneﬁt that will








Equation (5) yields the following investment rule: if Fτ ≤ Ft , it is optimal for
the ﬁrm to invest immediately, while if Fτ > Ft , it is optimal to wait until the
net beneﬁt is equal to Fτ. Finally, if the CA wishes to incentivate the ﬁrm to
18The discount rate r can either be adjusted for risk or the expectation for the discount
factor can be taken with respect to a risk-adjusted probability measure with r as the risk-free
discount rate (Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 1979).
19When it is established in the PPC that the CA can revoke the contract if the total penalty
reaches an upper bound G, the previous Perpetual Put Option in (2) turns into an American






(1 − e−rT) = Gp
Modelling this option is more complicated than the previous (2) but the results do not sub-
stantially diﬀer.
20See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), p. 315-316.







































7respect the contractual time, it must ﬁx a penalty fee such that Fτ = Ft. From










which, ceteris paribus, depends on π,σ (via β) and Ct.
According to (6), if the CA expects to be endorsed with a low probability
π of enforcing the penalty clause and/or a high current investment cost Ct (i.e.
for decreasing mark-up p−Ct) , it should increase the value of the penalty fee to
discourage the ﬁrm from delays. Yet, since d((β−1)/β)/dσ > 0, by (6) the CA
must set a higher penalty fee to induce the ﬁrm not to infringe the contractual
delivery date.
We now investigate the probability of the penalty’s enforcement more deeply:
speciﬁcally, we assume that a low probability of penalty enforcement may arise
from at least two diﬀerent sources.
First, if the court of law - to which the parties refer in case of dispute -
considers the penalty imposed to be “excessive”, it may decide not to enforce it
or to reduce it to an extent estimated as reasonably covering the damages caused
by the contractor’s breach.22 In order to include this case in our model, we
assume that the probability of enforcement by the court π depends on the value
of penalty c with the properties that π′(c) < 0, π(c
¯
) = 1 and limc→∞ π(c) = 0,
where c
¯
≥ 0 represents the minimum value of a time unit (i.e. fee per day)
considered reasonable by the court of law.23
A second element aﬀecting the enforceability of the penalty clause is the
“quality” of the judical system. Following Guasch et al. (2003), we thus multiply
the probability π(c) by a parameter θ ∈ [0,1] which refers to the average time
that the court of law takes to resolve disputes.24
According to these assumptions, the optimal penality design (6) is now given









= 0, for c∗ ≥ c
¯
. (7)
22In the literature on the ﬁrm’s breach of the contract, this discretionality by the court
of law is commonly referred to as the “liquidated damage principle”. Delay in delivering
the contracted investment should be referred to as a speciﬁc case of the ﬁrm’s breach of the
contract and the court can apply the above principle to cover the reasonable damage caused
by delays to society. For a discussion of the application of the “liquidate damage principle” in
PPCs, see Dimitri et al. (2004, Ch. 4, pp. 85-86); for an analysis of the economic incentives
pertaining to it, see Anderlini et al. (2007).
23In the US experience of PPC in the highway construction industry, the “unit time value”
is typically expressed as a cost per day. It is calculated by the State highway agency (the CA
in our model) referring to the “daily road-user cost”, which include items such as travel time,
travel distance, fuel expense, etc.. See Herbsman et al. (1995) for an example of the “daily
road-user cost” calculation used by the Kansas Department of Transportation.
24We are aware that the quality of justice is often discussed in the economic literature with
reference to many other dimensions, such as accuracy and costs in pursuing legal actions.
Considering only the timing dimension, we would stress here the relevance of the common
saying “justice delayed is justice denied”.
8In order to illustrate the properties of (6) and (7), in what follows we provide
some numerical solutions of both and discuss their applications with reference
to the Italian case. For the sake of simplicity, the choice of parameters for the
calibration has been made following indications from related studies as far as
possible (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Herbsman et al., 1995). The price of the
contracted investment is normalized to one, i.e. p = 1, and the parameters of
the model take the following values: r = 0.10;25 α = −0.05;26 Ct = 0.7,0.8,0.9
and σ = 0.3,0.4,0.5.
Let us ﬁrst evaluate (6). As far as the probability π is concerned, we simply
consider three cases: perfect enforceability, i.e. π = 1, and two cases of reduced
enforceability with π = 0.5, and π = 0.25 respectively.
Table 2 shows the optimal penalties expressed in day terms as a percentage
of p for diﬀerent levels of Ct and π = 1. In the case of perfect enforceability, the
optimal penalty falls within the interval 0.04% to 0.08% : this range is consistent
with the one suggested by the Italian legislation on penalty fees in PPCs (i.e.,
0.03% − 0.1%). However, since c∗(π) = 1
πc∗(π = 1), this penality range rapidly
increases to 0.08%− 0.15 % and to 0.16%− 0.30 % when the probability π falls
to 0.5 and 0.25 respectively.27
0.07850 0.06521 0.05390 0.9
0.06947 0.05766 0.04760 0.8
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0.06947 0.05766 0.04760 0.8






Table 2: Optimal penalty for diﬀerent values of Ct and σ, π = 1,α = −0.05,
and r = 10% expressed in % and in day terms.
Inspection of Table 2 shows that, according to the Real Option Theory, the
higher the cost of the investment Ct and/or the uncertainty (i.e. σ), the higher
25Although r should be the return that an investor can earn on other investments with
comparable risk characteristics, throughout our analysis we simply refer it to the social rate
of discount that the Italian government suggests should be usedto evalute most public projects.
For Italy this ranges between 8% and 12%, with the possibility of dropping to 5% for projects
undertaken in the southern regions (see: Pennisi and Scandizzo, 2003).
26We assume α < 0 in order to stress the value of waiting to invest. The results do not
diﬀer qualitatively if α ≥ 0 as long as α < r.
27We have performed other simulations which show that this result is robust on changing
the value of some parameters, as for r = 8%,15%, and α = −0.1.
9becomes the optimal penalty c∗. In other words, both the investment cost Ct and
the uncertainty σ incentivate the ﬁrm to defer the contracted investment. This,
in turn, calls for higher penalties to make the ﬁrm comply with the contracted
execution time.
For example, for Ct = 0.7, when σ increases from 30% to 50%, the penalty
c∗ increases by about 42%. This increment is larger as Ct increases, but at a
decreasing rate: when σ increases from 30% to 50%, c∗ is subject to an increase
of about 46% for Ct = 0.8 and of about 45% for Ct = 0.9. Finally, when σ
increases from 30% to 50% and Ct rises from 0.7 to 0.9, the total eﬀect on the
optimal c∗ is roughly a 90% increase.
Let us now calculate (7). For the sake of simplicity, we assume π(c) = (c/c)
η
for c ≥ c, and the elasticity η of the probability π as taking two diﬀerent values,
η = 0.3 and η = 0.7, respectively. In other words, when the CA sets a penalty
higher than the c
¯
- i.e. the lower value considered reasonable by the court -
an increase in the elasticity η determines a rapid decrease in the probability π
that the court will enforce the penalty. If the elasticity is less than one, so that
higher values of c
¯
are deemed excessive by the court, increasing values of both
σ and Ct lead to higher optimal penalties. In the calibration, c
¯
takes the values
of 0.03% and 0.1%, which are respectively the lower and upper bound of the
penalty fee in PPC as set by the Italian legislation.
Finally, interpreting θ as the probability that a court of law is able to resolve
a dispute in a year, in order to gauge the eﬀect of the “quality” of the judicial
system we set 1/θ = 3 so as to refer to average number of years the Italian
courts take to resolve legal disputes.28






















Tables 3 and 4 below show the optimal penalties obtained by simulations of
(8) for c
¯
= 0.03% and η = 0.3, and η = 0.7. In both the Tables, one observes
that the higher the values of Ct and σ, the higher is the optimal penalty c∗.
Moreover, one notes that the optimal penalties are highly sensitive to the value
of c. Speciﬁcally, when c = 0.03%, for both η = 0.3 and η = 0.7, the optimal
penalty c∗ always exceeds the range 0.03% − 0.1%.
28We refer here to the average duration of a civil trial in Italy, because the civil court of
law is the forum authorized to deal with these disputes. Note that the average duration of
a civil trial adopted in the calibration is consistent with the period to which our data-set on
the Italian PPCs refers.
100.32698 0.25086 0.19109 0.9
0.27462 0.21042 0.16003 0.8
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Table 3: Optimal penalty for diﬀerent values of Ct and σ, c = 0.03%,
θ = 1/3,α = −0.05, r = 10%, η = 0.3
expressed in % and in day terms.
1.40607 0.75761 0.40149 0.9
0.93577 0.50271 0.26542 0.8
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0.93577 0.50271 0.26542 0.8






Table 4: Optimal penalty for diﬀerent values of Ct and σ, c
¯
= 0.03%,
θ = 1/3,α = −0.05, r = 10%, η = 0.7
expressed in % and in day terms.
By contrast, when the value of the penalty considered reasonable by the
court of law is c = 0.1% , if the elasticity of the probability is η = 0.3, the
optimal penalty c∗ is higher than 0.1% only for a high value of Ct and/or σ. In
all the other cases, the CA will ﬁnd it convenient to set the fee proposed by the
court (Table 5).
110.19518 0.14975 0.11406 0.9
0.16393 0.12560 0.1 0.8
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Table 5: Optimal penalty for diﬀerent values of Ct and σ, c = 0.1%,
θ = 1/3,α = −0.05, r = 10%, η = 0.3
expressed in % and in day terms.
Finally, when c = 0.1% and η = 0.7, the optimal penalty is always c∗ = c
= 0.1%, whatever the value of Ct and σ. In other words, when both c and the
elasticity η are high, the probability that the court of law will enforce a penalty
greater than 0.1% decreases dramatically to zero.
3 A penalty/premium scheme
In the previous section we investigated how a PPC should comprise a penalty
clause for delay designed to optimally induce the contractor to invest at the
contracted time t. Many PPCs, however, commit the contractor to invest at a
future date t′ > t and also include an incentive/disincentive (I/D) clause stating
that, on the one hand, if the contractor is able to complete the project ahead
of scheduled t′ it will be entitled to premium fee I whist, on the other hand, if
the contractor delays completion, a penalty D will be imposed.
Although the CA may introduce diﬀerent and alternative I/D designs, we
consider here the simplest one where the ﬁrm receives a constant premium/penalty
fee c for each period (day, month, year, etc.) with which it anticipates/delays
the investment with respect to t′ > t.29 In other words, the present section
investigates how this I/D rule - where the premium and the penalty are iden-
tically deﬁned in their amounts, but with opposite signs - should be optimally
designed.
Following the approach presented in the previous section, the current NPV,
say N, of the project for the contractor complying with the contractual delivery
29Herbsman et al., 1995 underline that in the real world when CAs adopt the I/D rule, the
same value for both the incentive and the disincentive fee is generally used.
12time now becomes:30






where δ = r − α.31
As in the previous section, the inclusion in the procurement contract of a
I/D rule makes the contractor’s investment decision equivalent to exercising a
Perpetual Put Option whose value is now given by Pt ≡ Φt − πΛt, where Φt
and π are as in (2) and Λt is now equal to (see Appendix):
Λt = Et















In (10), the expected value Et is calculated with respect to both τ and the
probability that τ is lower (greater) than t′. According to (2) and (10) the














which should be maximized with respect to Fτ.
From (11), if the contractual time is very long, i.e. t′ → ∞, the second term
on the l.h.s. disappears and the contractor will get the premium by investing
before t′ with probability one. If, conversely, the contractual time t′ is very
short, i.e. t′ → t, the second term on the l.h.s. of (11) reduces to c
r as in (4).
The contractor will then incur a penalty since, with probability one, it invests
when the contractual time is over. Finally, because the term c
re−r(t′−t) enters
(11) as a constant, the optimal investment trigger Fτ is still given by (5) as
well as the ﬁrm’s investment decision rule. That is, the contractor defers the
infrastructure delivery date until Ft reaches the trigger Fτ from below for the
30Note that if t′ is set by the CA to allow the contractor to maximize the NPV (9), depending




















Ct. In the case of r = δ, we get Nt = e−r(t′−t)Ft. Since Ft > 0 it is optimal to
invest immediately, i.e. t′ = t. If r > δ the solution of the ﬁrst order condition represents a
minimum as
∂2Nt
∂(t′)2 > 0 and, then, the optimal value is found on one of the boundaries, i.e. it
is given by max[Ft,limt′→∞ Nt]. However, since limt′→∞ Nt = 0 it is still optimal to invest
immediately.
31The term r−δ can be interpreted as the certainty-equivalent rate of return (see Mc Donald
and Siegel, 1984; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
13ﬁrst time. In this respect, if the exercise time τ is lower than t′, the contractor
gains a premium, otherwise it must pay a fee.
As before, whenever Pt > Nt it will be proﬁtable for the contractor to infringe
the contractual time t′. Thus, the diﬀerence Pt −Nt represents the contractor’s
opportunity cost in delivering the investment according to the contracted date
t′ instead of taking advantage of the investment timing ﬂexibility which pertains
to the I/D clause.
We complete the analysis by calculating the optimal I/D fee which induces
the contractor to respect the completion date t′. In this regard, note that since
the exercise time τ is stochastic and c is constant (i.e. c is not contingent on
τ), the CA must set a policy-rule referring to the probability distribution of τ.
For the sake of simplicity, we follow the simple average-time rule32:
E(τ) = t′ (12)
In this case, as we show in the Appendix, the mean time that Ft, with
starting point Ft > Fτ, takes to hit the upper trigger Fτ for the ﬁrst time is
given by:






with m ≡ (1
2σ2 − (r − δ) > 0 and Cτ = p − Fτ.33 According to (13) and (12),










Since when t′ = t and t′ > t, (14) is respectively equal to and smaller than
(6), the results obtained in the previous section can be replicated for the I/D
scheme as well.
It is worth noting that as (t′ − t) increases, the optimal I/D fee diminishes.
That is, when the contractual time t′ is a long way from the current time t, the
incentive for the contractor to delay the investment decreases and the CA is able
to minimize premia outpayment by undercutting the I/D fee. When the interval
t′ − t is very long, we have the paradox that the contractor must somehow be
incentivated, by means of a premium, to respect the contracted delivery date
for the investment.
4 Final remarks and policy implications
Public procurement contracts account for a sheer volume of economic activity
in many countries, and the signiﬁcant evidence of harmful delays in the delivery
32Depending on diﬀerent assumptions about the CA’s risk aversion, this rule can be made
more stringent by giving greater weights to diﬀerent moments in the delivery timing distrib-
ution.
33Obviously m should be positive; otherwise E(τ) = ∞ (see Cox and Miller, 1965, p.
221-222).
14of the contracted investment is a very important issue for investigation. Various
empirical analyses of these delays in Italian PPCs seem to demostrate that the
penalty rules included in these contracts are generally ineﬀective.
The main goal of this study has thus been to explain investment delays when
a penalty clause is included in the PPC. To this end, we set out a Real Option
model enabling us to correctly deﬁne the PPC’s value when a penalty clause
is incorporated. Our starting point has been that when such a penalty fee is
present, the contractor has - to some extent - the option of deciding its optimal
investment timing, so that its contract value becomes higher. Taking this invest-
ment timing ﬂexibility into account, we have modelled the investment decision
as a Perpetual Put Option that the contractor can exercise. Then, in order to
evaluate the properties of this setting and deﬁne the optimal penalty range (i.e.
the range which induces the contractor to comply with the contracted delivery
time), we have performed some calibrations of the model speciﬁcally referring
to PPCs in Italy. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst analysis on investment de-
livery delays in PPC which adopts a Real Option approach. Our ﬁndings - quite
surprisingly - show that in the case of perfect enforceability of the penalty, the
optimal fee falls within an interval which is consistent with the one suggested
by the Italian legislation on PPCs’.34 These results thus suggest that the large
delays in the Italian PPCs are due not to incorrectly set penalty fees, but - as
highlighted by the PPC data-set investigated by Albano et al. (2007) - to the
low enforceability of the penalty rule itself. We then extended our model to
include this issue. Speciﬁcally, in case of veriﬁable delays, a low probability of
enforcing the committed penalty may arise from at least two diﬀerent sources:
a) when the court of law - to which the parties refer in the case of litigation -
has discretionality in reducing (or even not enforcing) the penalty imposed; b)
when the “quality” of the judicial system is unsatisfactory. Indeed, as to the
former source, if the court of law deems the penalty excessive, it may decide
to reduce it to an extent considered as reasonably covering the damages caused
by the contractor’s breach. As to the latter source, we have speciﬁcally deﬁned
the quality of the judicial system by referring to the average time taken to re-
solve disputes between the parties. Both these elements - if anticipated by the
contractor - can play a crucial role in overriding the incentive provided by the
penalty, and this seems to be the case in the Italian PPCs.
Thus, while our analysis is motivated by the Italian experience in PPCs, it
oﬀers the following suggestions in regard to designing the optimal penalty for
delay in procurement contracts:
i) since the volatility of the project costs incentivates the ﬁrm to defer the
contracted investment time, this, in turn, again calls for higher penalties to
reduce delays;
ii) further, low quality of the judicial system coupled with a court of law
with high discretionality in reducing the penalty calls for higher penalties to
induce the contractor to comply with the contracted execution time.
34Our calibrations also show that the optimal penalty should be higher, the larger the
investment cost and the uncertainty; and that the penalty grows in amount, but at a decreasing
rate, as the investment cost increases.
15These suggestions also open the way to considerations on designing a mecha-
nism alternative to the penalty fee for preventing delays in the PPC investment
delivery. This has not been investigated in this paper but is part of our research
agenda: indeed, if the CA’s contractual payments to the contractor can be made
contingent on the contract’s execution timing, this would by itself induce the
contractor to avoid delays. Speciﬁcally, if the contingent payments to the con-
tractor are equal to its opportunity beneﬁts in deferring the investment, there
is no reason to resort to a penalty rule in the contract, i.e. the more complete
the ex-ante contract design, the less likely it becomes that the contractor will
delay delivery.35
We have then extended the model to an incentive/disincentive rule (I/D),
that is, a framework where the contractor is respectively rewarded/ﬁned if it
anticipates/delays the investment’s execution. Within a very simple symmetric
I/D design (i.e the contractor receives a constant premium/penalty fee for each
period that it anticipates/delays the contracted timing of delivery), we found
that the CA has the incentive to reduce the I/D fee to minimize expected premia
outpayment to the contractor.
Finally, we show in the Appendix how our model can be applied to deﬁne the
optimal penalty for delays in concession contracts, where, diﬀerently from pro-
curements, once the contractor has made the contracted investment, it recovers
its cost by managing the service, i.e. with the revenues from users’ tariﬀs.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of (11)
Consider (10). After some calculations and arrangements we obtain:
Λt = Et



















































where the optimal exercise time τ is deﬁned as
τ = min(t ≥ 0 | Fτ = argmaxPt) (16)
35However, as highlighted by Bajari and Tadelis in their seminal contribution 2001, "a more
complete ex-ante design... imposes higher ex-ante cost on the buyer" (i.e. on the CA). Thus,
our results highlight a new trade-oﬀ which weights - on the one hand - the ex-ante cost for the
CA in designing a more complete contract and - on the other - the probability of the penalty’s
enforcement.
16According to (16), at time t, the probability of having a bonus is the probability
of having an optimal exercise time τ less than (or equal to) the contractual time
t′. In other words, this is the probability of the geometric Brownian motion Ft
reaching the critical value F∗
τ within [t, t′] starting from an initial condition
Ft < F∗
τ . This can be expressed as (Harrison, 1985)



































































A.2 Proof of (13)
Consider the process Ct on an interval 0 < a < Ct < b < ∞, with left boundary
a and right boundary b. Deﬁning ta,b as the stochastic variable that describes
the time it takes Ct to hit for the ﬁrst time either a or b, we are able to evaluate



































where κ = 1−
2(r−δ)
σ2 .Since κ > 0, letting b → ∞ and a → C∗ < Ct we obtain the
expected time that the construction cost will take to reach the lower boundary
C∗ starting from Ct.
lim
a→C∗,b→∞




























































































































































A.3 A concession contract
In this Appendix we show how the model presented in Section 2 can be ﬁtted
into the framework of a concession contract. Concession contracts mainly diﬀer
from procurement contracts in the level of responsibilities transferred to the con-
tractor: in particular, through a concession contract a public authority entrusts
a third party (i.e. the concessionaire) with the total or partial management of
an economic activity for which the concessionaire assumes the operating risk.36
As an example, suppose that a ﬁrm has signed a contract for the provision of
a service to be started immediately (i.e. at time t) and which requires, on the
part of the ﬁrm, a completely irreversible capital outlay K (e.g. building an
infrastructure). The contract also includes a clause requiring the concessionaire
to pay a penalty if the provision of the service is delayed. Speciﬁcally, the con-
cessionaire pays a constant fee d for each period (e.g. day, month, year, etc.) of
delay in its starting of the service.
Under these assumptions, the value of the concession for a concessionaire
that complies with the contracted delivery time is:
Gt = Vt − K (18)
36The European legislation envisages two main types of concession contract: works con-
cessions and service concessions. Directive 93/37/EC distinguishes a work concession from
a public works contract by the fact that the concessionaire is granted the right to exploit
a construction as a consideration for having erected it. Directive 2004/18/EC deﬁnes ser-
vice concessions as contracts of the same type as public service contracts except for the
fact that the consideration for the provision of services consists in the right to exploit the
service. A service concession exists when the concessionaire bears the risks involved in estab-
lishing and exploiting the service and obtains revenues from users by charging fees or tariﬀs
(http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/122011.htm).
18where Vt ≥ K is the project’s value (i.e. the future discounted cash ﬂow gener-
ated by the project and the provision of the service).
As before, if we assume that Vt is driven by the process dVt = νVtdt +
λVtdzt with λ > 0 and ν ≥ 0, the inclusion of the penalty clause gives the
concessionaire the option of deferring the investment. The value of this option
is analogous to a perpetual American Call option:
Bt = Ψt − π∆t = Et(e−r(τ−t))Gτ − πEt





where Ψt is the expected and discounted proﬁt deriving from exercising the
option to invest when the net beneﬁt has increased to Gτ > Gt instead of doing
it now and obtaining Gt, ∆t is the expected value of the penalty, r is the
risk-free interest rate and τ is the exercise time. Since Et












, according to (19), the ex-














where γ > 1 is the positive root of the quadratic function 1
2λ
2x(x−1)+νx−r =
0.By maximizing Bt with respect to Gτ we obtain Gτ = 1
γ−1(K − γπ d
r) and
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